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Kant, Holderlin, and the experience of
longing
RICHARD ELDRIDGE

There is a natural and reasonable temptation to try to find or ground
morality within common human life. If moral commandments
cannot be lived out there, then what good are they, and why ought
we to allow ourselves to be tyrannized by them? So either, it seems,
we must show how a culture of justice or freedom or respect is
achievable in accordance with one of these high ideals, or we must
give them up in favor of more modest balancings of values that are
not so categorical. Does not "ought" imply "can"?
Yet it may not be so easy quite to do what seems so natural and
reasonable. Is it possible not reasonably to care about freedom or
justice or respect, and not also to regard this care as higher or deeper,
more woven into our humanity, than a liking for pistachio icecream? Our sense of the pull of certain high ideals on us, a pull that
involves our humanity, may be not so easily stilled. But then it is not
so obvious either how to achieve a culture of justice or freedom or
respect, particularly in advanced technological cultures with significant divisions of labors and class antagonisms. What pieces of
institutional design or state policy or individual habitual action
could possibly lead to universal justice, freedom, or respect?
It is this sense of the human person as caught between an
aspiration toward the ideal and also the standing defeat of that
aspiration that is expressed or released in the texts of Kant and
Holderlin, as well as in other major Romantic writers, German and
English. Within major Romantic and Idealist texts, literary and
philosophical, German and English, the struggles of protagonists,
real and implied, to come to terms with both the categorical appeal
of high ideals and the difficulties of achieving them are traced. The
activity imagined for these protagonists itself emerges as a kind of
poiesis, an effort imaginatively to take up present routes of cultural
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activity and to redirect or resignify them in at least partial furtherance of the ideal. Or so, at any rate, it may emerge when Kant and
Holderlin are read through or against one another.

It is nowadays little realized and less appreciated first that Kant's
philosophical project was essentially descriptive, and second that in
his descriptions Kant dwells above all on human reason's difficulties
and perplexities, as though reason were at odds with itself and as
though our lives, in which we exercise our rational capacities, were
opaque to us, tangled. But that is, mostly, what Kant says. "Human
reason," he famously tells us in launching his project of critique, in
the Critique of Pure Reason's first sentence, "is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not
able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not
able to answer" (Avii).1 Thus "human reason precipitates itself into
darkness and contradictions" (Aviii).
The project of critique, to be sure, aims at undoing these contradictions and illuminating the darkness. The critique of pure reason
is to serve as "a tribunal which will assure to reason its lawful
claims, and dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by despotic
decrees, but in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable
laws" (Axi-xii). That is, the critique of pure reason will sort out the
principles that we are entitled to assert - "All events have a cause;"
"An unchanging quantum of substance underlies all changes of
appearance;" "As beings with practical reason we must treat all
beings with practical reason not as means only, but always also as
ends" - from speculative claims that are empty, that are not
ineluctably woven through our lives as conscious and self-conscious
beings - claims such as "God is the providential first cause and
orderer of nature;" or "My soul is a self-identical, simple, and
indestructible substance." In this way, by sorting principles into
"lawful claims," on the one hand, and "groundless pretensions," on
the other, the critique of pure reason will enable us to escape from
both despotic dogmatism and anarchic skepticism (Aix) into selfassured self-responsibility in our practices, as we live by the principles that have survived critique.
This, at any rate, is the ambition of the Critical Philosophy. We are
to become reasonably responsible under and to contentful and
secure principles we cannot help but have in our cognitive, moral,
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and aesthetic practices, freed alike from attachment to false idols,
empty principles, and overmastery by an anarchic, arbitrary otherness. This same image of the task of reason or its criticism in aiming
at reasonable self-responsibility betweeen empty idolatry and anarchic skepticism also massively informs the English philosophic and
poetic traditions, as it figures centrally in the texts of both Hume and
Wordsworth.2
Is this ambition fulfilled? Are our perplexities and contradictions
undone by critique's tribunal in sorting principles? It is not so clear.
Certain anxieties or worries about human responsibilities persist in
Kant's texts. Instead of being resolved, they are continually rearticulated. Problems supposedly solved in the Critique of Pure
Reason or the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals recur,
particularly in the Critique of Judgment. Principles supposedly
justified and woven into our practices as self-conscious beings are
re-queried. What is my place in the world of nature as a rational,
moral being? How can I express in action in nature my nature as a
free, rational, noumenal being standing under moral principle? If I
can't do that, or can't do so stably and securely, so that every act I
undertake is a test of my rational nature, of whether it can sustain
itself in the world and whether the world will allow this, then do I
really know myself as a free, rational, noumenal being, possessed of
a form of continuous, apperceptive self-consciousness rooted in
noumenal activity? Is the world of phenomena that appears to my
apperceptively unified consciousness really there for me, stably
ordered under causal laws no matter what, if the consciousness to
which that world appears might fail to sustain itself in coherent
action? What awareness of the apperceptive unity of my consciousness enabled me to follow out the threads of transcendental logic?
Can that awareness falter? Can apperceptive unity falter? How was
or is critique possible at all?3
These questions are raised in the Critique of Judgment as Kant
attempts to put the parts of his system - phenomena and noumena,
nature and freedom - back together again, to find, as he puts it, "a
ground of the unity of the supersensible that lies at the basis of
nature, with what the concept of freedom contains in a practical
way."4 That is, there must be something behind or under natural
phenomena and also behind or under my rational free will. There
must be a unity between these supersensible somethings that
enables and guarantees all at once my continuing, apperceptively
unified consciousness and self-consciousness, the presentation to
177
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that consciousness of a stably ordered phenomenal world under a
system of laws that is not a hodgepodge, and, most importantly and
directly, my ability to act as a rational being, commanded by moral
principle, in that world: causality by freedom "is to take effect in the
world" (C/, 37). How?
It may seem that this characterization of Kant's project runs
together topics that ought to be kept apart. What do the problems of
my own self-consciousness and of knowledge have to do with the
problems of the formula and requirements of the moral law, or with
the problem of the justification of judgments of taste? Kant, after all,
devoted three separate Critiques to these problems. Surely his main
insight is that we just are as self-conscious beings committed to
certain principles of understanding that describe an order among
phenomena present to us, and we just do regard ourselves as free
insofar as we stand under a moral law. Surely it would be better, and
more in the Kantian spirit, simply to explicate and elucidate these
separate epistemological and moral principles, avoiding all this
nonsense about freedom in the world. As Kant notoriously said in his
open letter on Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, in response to Fichte's
effort to develop a metaphysical system upholding freedom in the
world, "May God protect us from our friends, and we shall watch out
for our enemies ourselves."5 Why not back to description, explication, and critique, away from the metaphysics of freedom in nature?
The trouble with this anti-metaphysical line of thought - dominant
in Kant's contemporary Anglo-American reception - is that it is
belied by certain passages in Kant's major texts, where Kant himself
connects the topic of apperceptively unified self-consciousness with
that of standing under the moral law, as he worries about the place
of the rational subject in the natural world. Here are two such
passages:
Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses,
knows himself also through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and
inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses.
He is thus to himself, on the one hand, phenomenon, and on the other hand,
in respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the
receptivity of sensibility, a purely intelligible object. We entitle these
faculties understanding and reason. The latter, in particular, we distinguish
in a quite peculiar and especial way from all empirically conditioned
powers. For it views its objects exclusively in the light of ideas ... Reason
does not here follow the order of things as they present themselves in
appearance, butframesfor itself with perfect spontaneity an order of its own
according to ideas, to which it adapts the empirical conditions, and
178
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according to which it declares actions to be necessary, even although they
have never taken place, and perhaps never will take place ...
Now in view of these considerations, let us take our stand, and regard it as
at least possible for reason to have causality with respect to appearances.
(A546-7=B574-5; A548=B576)
In this passage we see a characteristic Kantian transition from
claims about self-consciousness to claims about our powers as moral
beings. I must regard myself as an intelligible object, as spontaneously and transparently able to formulate and apply certain rules,
for example to say "this is a chair." My seeing of objects is rulegoverned in a way that is transparent to my consciousness. I not
only have chair-stimuli, as it were, I am also aware of myself as
seeing a chair, as subsuming that object under certain sortal rules
freely and transparently.6 And it is this very freedom or spontaneity,
evident in the transparently rule-governed empirical judgments of a
self-conscious being and constitutive of its apperceptive unity, that
at the same time is the source of the moral law. This spontaneity
"frames an order of its own according to ideas," responding to or
instancing something higher than the ways of the natural, phenomenal world and legislating for action in that world. Thus, as the
Critique of Practical Reason continues, "I have this right [to accept
the existence in me of noumenal causality, a causality of freedom
with the moral law as its determining ground], by virtue of the pure
nonempirical origin of the concept of cause."7
To be sure, I can regard myself as a noumenal cause only insofar
as I deliberate about how I ought to act. I cannot understand
theoretically what in nature or ultimate reality makes me such a
being. "We have thought of... man as belonging to a pure intelligible
world, though in this relation man is unknown to us." 8 But there is
at least this much. I transparently follow rules in making empirical
judgments. Certain rules - the concepts of events as caused, of
qualities as pertaining to substances - are necessary for there to be
any empirical judgments at all. Adherence to these rules brings it
about that my consciousness is judgmental and apperceptively
unified. These rules are themselves freely created: there is no
experience of causality or substance. And whatever freely creates
those rules - reason, or spontaneity, or pure understanding stimulated by reason - distinguishes me from all merely natural beings
and legislates for my actions in the world, yet in ways that are
ultimately mysterious to me. I do not know how or why I am both a
free, noumenal agent and an embodied, natural being.
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So can I really sustain these beliefs about myself that apparently
force themselves on me? What if physiological psychology advances
in tracing the motions of my body back to complicated neurochemical causes? What if my culture does not make sense, so that
nothing I do seems readily to evince or express freedom and
practical rationality? Suppose things seem just to happen. How is
freedom to "take effect in the world"? My awareness of myself as a
unified self-consciousness, possessed of a moral dignity born of
reason's spontaneity, seems to fade. Maybe it is all just an illusion.
This is, I think, the deep anxiety that is latent in Kant's extraordinary wanderings back and forth between claims about what we
must presuppose (we have apperceptively unified consciousnesses;
we are free) and claims about ultimate and impenetrable mysteries
(the interaction of phenomena and noumena, nature and freedom;
our opacity to ourselves as both natural and freely rational beings).
And it is this deep anxiety that comes to the fore in the Critique of
Judgment and in the historical and anthropological essays. It is the
presence of this anxiety in Kant's texts, his mode of responding to it,
though never quite stilling it, and its refiguration in his successors English and German, philosophical and poetic - that launches and
defines Romanticism. This anxiety, together with certain ways of
responding to it, is as definitive of human life as anything is,
according to these texts. We are beings who are caught between
aspirations to realize our dignity and free rationality in a transparent, harmonious culture, aspirations we can't it seems, give up,
and the defeat of these aspirations by nature and culture as they
stand, even as we can imagine recasting them. So we are caught in
anxiety. Are our aspirations, capacities, and possibilities genuine, or
not? How might we make sense of ourselves as having something to
live up to?
Kant's way of responding to these questions is exemplary. When
he came in the Critique of Judgment and in the historical and
anthropological essays explicitly to confront the problem of how, in
what manner, self-conscious self-identity, morality, and freedom
could be expressed in a stable, receptive world, what Kant mostly
did was to produce imaginative narratives of the past and future of
human culture. The function of these narratives is to uncover the
existence of a human capacity, practical reason, as that capacity has
been dimly, partially, exercised in practice, thence to suggest that
the full, self-conscious exercise of that capacity may inaugurate a
perfected culture, a kingdom of ends, in which all human beings
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reciprocally respect, attend to, and practically love all human
beings, without coercion.
Roughly, Kant's imaginative narrative of humanity's progressive
development and realization of its capacities goes like this.9 Originally human beings are creatures of sensation and animal instinct.
They then begin to use their reason to make comparisons among
things, perhaps preferring some foods to others, and further acquiring new, artificial desires through imagining satisfactions,
rather than merely pursuing them instinctively. Having these artificial desires and no longer being dominated by instinct, human
beings "become aware of what it means to choose,"10 become
conscious of their negative freedom. Arising out of this consciousness of freedom comes an awareness of one's life in time and of a
need to work and to plan. Human beings become aware of, and
come to fear, their own death, and they take rational pains to avoid
it. But this is not the end of the story. Through the use of reason,
"the human being becomes aware, however obscurely, that he is the
end of nature." 11 This awareness of oneself as an end, and of all
rational beings as ends, is then imagined to drive two further
developments. Initially we are to establish a rational state, "a
universal civic society which administers law among men." 12 This
civil society is not, however, the final end of our development. It is
rather the necessary framework and precondition for our further
development of a kingdom of ends, a rational community in which
our ends "are brought systematically into harmony by reason as
reciprocal end and means, like the interdependent organs of a
living thing." 13 Achieving this harmonious culture of rational
freedom, a moral culture beyond politics and the enforcement of
rights within competition, is the work of Enlightenment, "man's
release from his self-incurred tutelage."14 Kant regards his own
philosophical writing as advancing this work, helping to free us
from tutelage or service to our animal nature so as to achieve
collective rational freedom. His articulation of the principle of
morality is to help to move us first to found a liberal state and then
further, through culture, to bring our ends into rational harmony
with one another.
This advance toward freedom first through politics and then
through culture is not, however, the work of philosophy alone. Art
has a crucial role to play in this development. "Fine art ...," Kant
writes, "has the effect of advancing the culture of the mental
powers in the interests of social communication" [CJ, 166). The
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work of art, in blending sublime, natural originality, the "primary
property" of genius, "the innate mental aptitude through which
nature gives the rule to art" (CJ, 168) with sense, intelligibility, and
the crafting of material serves as an exemplar of embodied freedom
in the world and a spur to its further development. In taking up
"something of a compulsory character ... or, as it is called, a
mechanism," that is, the demand to craft material intelligibly,
original artists embody the soul, which otherwise "would be bodyless and evanescent" (CJ, 164) ("gar keinen Korper haben und
ganzlich verdunsten wiirde").15 "The poet essays the task of interpreting to sense the rational ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom
of the blessed, hell, eternity, creation, & c. Or, again, as to things of
which examples occur in experience, e.g. death, envy, and all vices,
as also love, fame, and the like, transgressing the limits of experience he attempts with the aid of an imagination which emulates the
display of reason in its attainment of a maximum, to body them
forth to sense with a completeness of which nature affords no
parallel" (CJ, 176-177) ("in einer Vollstandigkeit sinnlich zu
machen, fur die sich in der Natur kein Beispiel findet").16 The
poet's work thus shows us that the embodiment of rational ideas,
including the idea of freedom, is possible. The poet's work thus
both locates us as beings for whom the project of constructing a
culture that fully embodies rational freedom is possible and advances that very project. It embodies, expresses, and advances our
aspirations as rational beings, and in doing so it "binds up language,
which otherwise would be mere letters, with spirit" (CJ 179,
modified) ("mit der Sprache, als bloPem Buchstaben, Geist verbindet").17 The poet's work, one might say, makes our sayings and
doings intelligible as ours. Rather than standing as mere material
happenstances, they become legible to us in the poet's high achievement
as vehicles of our possibilities for freedom, rooted in our rational
humanity or Spirit. We can, as it were, see our humanity in them.
This is in many ways a wonderful story. But how much reassurance about our capacities and possibilities does it provide? Do we
now know ourselves as possessors of rational freedom, able to
manifest that freedom in a harmonious moral culture? As thus
rehearsed, this story smacks of what Dostoyevsky stigmatized as
Schillerizing - blathering about the achievement of moral culture
through artistic activity. (In fairness to Schiller, the essays on the
sublime and on naive and sentimental poetry are a lot tougher than
the Letters, show more awareness than the Letters of the tendency of
182
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art in modernity to deepen antagonisms rather than to smooth things
over;18 and even in the Letters there is a crucial incoherence that
undoes Schiller's imagination of progress, as he wavers between
saying that artistic activity is merely instrumental to the emergence
of a moral culture and saying that it is rather an end it itself, as
though he can't quite really envision a definite path to the end of
history.) What is wrong with Schillerizing?
hi the first place, it scarcely requires much perceptiveness to
notice that Kant's narrative of our realization of our capacities has
not in fact come true. Bitterness, antagonism, envy, competitiveness,
violence, and domination are conspicuously more the stuff of our
lives than reciprocity and harmonious rational freedom. Nor did
Kant fail to notice this. The imaginative narrative of our progress in
realizing our capacities that he produces is merely conjectural in its
treatment of the past. With regard to the present it is merely an ideal
that should govern the writing of more specific histories and inform
our present political efforts. "Conjectures cannot make too high a
claim on one's assent. They cannot announce themselves as serious
business, but at best only as a permissible exercise of the imagination
guided by reason."19 Conjectural narrative is not intended by Kant to
be evidently true as things stand, nor to provide any justification of
our ascription to ourselves of rational capacities and self-legislated
moral principles. Officially, those ascriptions are secured by the
arguments of the first two Critiques, and the remarks about freedom
in history and art are mere playings out of possibilities established
elsewhere.
Unofficially, Kant's argumentative itinerary suggests, these later
narratives are epistemically crucial. In taking up the topic of how
freedom is to appear in the world, they literalize and develop an
anxiety about our capacities that was already latent in earlier
swerves between claims about our awareness of a noumenal spontaneity and its deliverances in us and claims about what we must
presuppose in so far as we already accept the idea that we have
overriding, categorical obligations.
But this reading scarcely makes things better. If we have no
secure prior warrant for ascribing certain capacities and possibilities to ourselves, but instead need the imaginative historical
narratives in order to make such ascriptions plausible, then why
narrate the history that way, with that ideal, in the face of the
obvious facts of misery and domination? Just who do we think we
are?
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Kant himself, to repeat, was aware of the obvious facts of history.
Recall that the imaginative historical narrative of our progress is a
story of the progressive development of our rational nature out of
our animal nature - a kind of second birth - through the setting up of
competitive, artificial desires. The birth pangs here are considerable.
Kant's general name for the energy or power that drives this development and shapes all of culture is antagonism:
The means employed by Nature to bring about the development of all the
capacities of men is their antagonism in society, so far as this is, in the end,
the cause of a lawful order among men. By "antagonism" I mean the
unsocial sociability of men, i.e. their propensity to enter into society,
together with a mutual opposition which constantly threatens to break up
the society ... This opposition it is which awakens all [man's] powers,
brings him to conquer his inclination to laziness, and, propelled by vainglory, lust for power, and avarice, to achieve a rank among his fellows whom
he cannot tolerate but from whom he cannot withdraw.20
Thus art, while embodying our soul and rational freedom, will also
embody conflict, vainglory, lust for power, and avarice. The ideal
narrative of our possible achievement is a narrative also of the
struggle of our nature against itself. The picture of human nature as
it expresses itself in history is neither naturalistic, despairing, and
Hobbesian-Nietzschean, nor optimistic, blandly Utopian, and apolitical, as certain strains in Rousseau and Marx are. It is rather what
Allen Wood calls a "deeply moralistic conception of the human
condition, which makes it axiomatic that human beings are capable
of living with one another on decent terms only when their natural
desires and dispositions are under quite strict constraint (if not
forcible external constraint, then rational self-constraint)."21 Every
exercise of power or virtue, every act of originality or courage or
kindness or justice or love that we might look to as advancing our
culture, will be at the same time marked by vainglory and antagonism. The virtues, the powers that might advance culture, are not
clearly harmoniously compossible among us. History is the record of
their exercise under and often contributing to relations of domination. Yet it makes sense to hope for their compossibility, to struggle
against our own vainglory in the hope of achieving a harmonious
kingdom of ends, even if we can't see how. "Nature," Kant tells us,
"reveals something, but very little" 22 of the path toward a kingdom
of ends. And yet we are also drawn toward it. Or so, at least, Kant's
story would have it.
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II
Here then are two beliefs that seem inescapable. We do not live in a
moral culture or kingdom of ends, but instead in a world of
antagonism, vainglory, and domination, without any clear sense of
how to inaugurate a moral culture. Yet we also believe - something
in us, something that among other things expresses itself in art,
seems to make us believe - in the dim possibility of a kingdom of
ends, believe that things will ultimately make sense, that the virtues
are compossible, that all things might express their natures harmoniously, that life is not all and only power against power, nature
against nature.
Narratives, or at least rich ones, explore how it is that we live with
both beliefs, in the space, one might say, of tragedy, not selfsufficient in our power to inaugurate a moral culture, but not
dispossessed of the aspiration to do so either. As Jean-Pierre Vernant
and Pierre Vidal Naquet put it,
The tragic sense of responsibility arises when human action becomes the
subject of a reflection, a debate, but has not yet acquired a status autonomous
enough to be self-sufficient. The proper domain of tragedy is situated in a
frontier zone where human actions come to be articulated with divine
power, and it is in that zone that they reveal their true sense, a sense not
known to the agents themselves, who, in taking on their responsibility,
insert themselves into an order between men and gods which surpasses the
understanding of man.23
The working out of this tragic sense of responsibility, as we are
caught between the demands of rational freedom and the difficulties
of antagonistic historical life, is tracked or traced in narrative, which
investigates how these demands and difficulties might be reconciled.
Narrative will be, one might say, the necessary scrutiny of our
powers and possibilities of rational freedom and moral culture as
they bump up against the facts of antagonism in history, those
powers and possibilities never quite disappearing, but never quite
receiving full realization either.
What is it like to live in such a way, to inhabit such a narrative or
to hold together narratively one's sense of possibilities of rational
freedom in a moral culture with one's sense of the immediate and
standing ways of the world? It is this sense of human life that is
powerfully expressed in Holderlin's elegies and in particular in
"Dichterberuf," "The Poet's Vocation."24 Many of Holderlin's lyrics
center around the persistence of longing, as the poet simultaneously
185
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seeks to envision a transfigured, moral culture of freedom and
reciprocity emerging out of the ashes of the old and confronts the
non-emergence in fact of such a culture. His sense of himself as a
bearer of rational humanity, one who has a soul to be materially
embodied in culture, is tied to his ability to envision narratively a
transfigured culture, so that when that envisioning falters in the face
of the ways of the world, so does the poet's sense of his own identity
and power. Yet the faltering is never quite complete, never quite a
collapse into complacency either, never quite a rejection of aspiration and a sense of possible power in favor of the naturalist, Humean
thought that all we can do is act on the basis of desires and projects
that we happen naturally to have, so that we would do well to break
with high aspirations and become honest eaters, drinkers, and
compromisers with the world. Holderlin never rests in such a
thought. Instead the lyrics close only in ambiguous, highly charged
ways, with a sense still of possible powers not yet housed in, or
attached to, any definite course of culture. "And let me say at once /
That I approached to see the Heavenly, / And they themselves cast
me down, deep down /Below the living, into the dark cast down /
The false priest that I am, to sing / For those who have ears to hear,
the warning song. / There" 25 "As on a holiday ..." ends. The poet's
sense of power, identity, and cultural possibility is further bound up
with a sense of obscure divinity in or around us, waiting to be
realized, but never quite present here, so that the poet's investigation
of genuine but blocked possibilities of poetic power and moral
culture in history is at the same time an investigation of the
possibility of a religious human life, a possibility never definitely
heralded, but always longed for. Holderlin is thus pre-eminently the
poet of what Schiller called "elegy in the narrower sense," wherein
nature and the ideal are an object of sadness," as nature "is treated
as lost" and the ideal "as unattained." 26 The persistence of the
elegiac tone in Hblderlin's texts produces a peculiarly intense
strangeness in them, a kind of inexplicable unparaphrasability. His
work is, as Eric Santner puts it, "a site where the contradictions,
stresses, longings, and disenchantments that scar our own modern
selves are passionately rehearsed."27
Holderlin's peculiarly intense elegiac tone or manner or substance
has been submitted to a number of explanations in literary history.
Santner suggests that Hblderlin's thought might be explained in
Oedipal terms as stemming from the lack of a "successfully internalized ... father as idealized totemic figure."28 For Santner,
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building on Lacan, it may be that only "identification with the figure
in whose names these [Oedipal] taboos were instituted in the first
place" 29 can enable one to work through grief and mourning at the
loss of the mother, so as to achieve an integrated self and reasonable
desire. Since Holderlin lacked such a father-figure - his father died
when Holderlin was two; his stepfather when he was seven - he is
condemned to an eternal "search for viable paternal totems" 30
throughout his life and work.
Or, following Weber and Benjamin, it may be modernity's fault. In
dividing life up into separate spheres of knowing through science,
acting morally and politically, attending aesthetically to art, working
for a wage, and consuming, the self is torn apart by the incoherence
of the routines of life offered in modernity. J. M. Bernstein, drawing
on Weber and Habermas, suggests that the modern art object expresses mourning for a lost integrated society and longing for its
recovery. This mourning and longing result, he claims, from "a
double isolation": first, "the diremption of the question of moral
value from questions of truth and falsity - the fact/value distinction
- that resulted from the growth of modern science and its methodological self-understanding; and secondly, the separation of artistic
worth from moral worth - the inscribing of art within the autonomous domain of the 'aesthetic'." 31 Holderlin's work is here cast as a
symptom of modernity's political pathology, in contrast with the
comparative healthy integrity of premodern societies then ruptured
by science and technology.
Or it may be that Holderlin's elegiac longing stems from a
simultaneous covert awareness of and repression of the agonies of
political life that is typical of the bourgeoise.32 What the bourgeoisie,
which generally does not suffer much under a market economy,
prefers to see as individual longing or alienation that is open to
aesthetic suasion is really a retrogressive attempt to displace and
deny a material anger rooted in class oppression of agricultural and
industrial laborers. On this reading too, Hblderlinian longing would
disappear were class consciousness and politics to develop explicitly, and this longing is itself a bourgeois indulgence that inhibits
that development.
Or it may be that Holderlin's longing itself contains or intimates its
own cure, as Heidegger suggests. "The poet," Heidegger writes in
considering Holderlin, "names the gods and names all things in that
which they are. This naming does not consist in something already
known being supplied with a name; it is rather when the poet speaks
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the essential word, the existent is by this naming nominated as what
it is ... The essence of poetry is the establishing of being by means of
the word." 33 For Heidegger, the experience of longing that is
expressed in Holderlin's poetry is open to cure through a more
attentive, patient, poetry that hearkens to Being in such a way that it
can point to the refiguration of culture and its existents. And indeed
Heidegger sees this hearkening and pointing as already underway in
Holderlin's work. Resoluteness in this hearkening and pointing is all
that is needful.
Or it may be that Holderlin's longing expresses the inextricable
entanglement of human consciousness with language, something in
its essence conventional and hence barred from satisfactory engagement with the natural, as de Man suggests in his radically antiHeideggerian reading:
Poetic language seems to originate in the desire to grow closer and closer to
the ontological status of the object, and its growth and development are
determined by this inclination. We saw that this movement is essentially
paradoxical and condemned in advance to failure ... The word is always a
free presence to the mind, the means by which the permanence of natural
entities can be put into question and thus negated, time and again, in the
endlessly widening spiral of the dialectic.34

For de Man, the entanglement of human consciousness and desire in
the conventionality of language that is always exterior to Being casts
human subjects as etres pour soi always vainly seeking to be also
etres en soi, and Holderlinian Romantic longing is the exemplary
expression of this unavoidable desire.
Each of these explanations has considerable interest and plausibility. Yet Holderlinian longing in fact encompasses and synthesizes
each of these cruder reductions of it. Would it help to cure us of such
longing if we all somehow had happy relationships with our fathers
or father-figures? Were pre-modern societies in fact free of alienation
and fragmentation, or are these phenomena, as Marx suggests,
already primordially present with the rudest forms of division of
labor and simply exacerbated in modern society? Could we return to
or inaugurate an integrated society beyond the antagonisms that seem
fearfully part of the stuffs of our identities? Would we even want to?
Would a class politics help to do this? Or will class politics itself be
an activity in part of individuals responding competitively to shared
conditions? Would we be better off politically to conceive of our
aspirations as divergently determined by various class experiences,
rather than as shaped in part by our nature's struggle with itself?
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So the reductive psychological and political readings of Holderlinian longing seem too optimistic, seem not to see how much this
longing runs through what we are. Heideggerian resoluteness seems
no more likely to cure this condition than do psychoanalytic therapy
or class politics. But de Man's reading of our ontological exteriority
to reality as conscious etres pour soi entangled with language seems
to cast us as victims of something, to counsel quietude, and to deny
the political and psychoanalytic dimensions of our condition that
we might address. If the political cannot cure us, then neither ought
we to flee from or deny it. What then is the character of our longing,
and how ought we to come to terms with it?
Here we may dwell on just how Holderlin expresses it. It is clear
that Holderlinian longing, for all that it also has psychoanalytic,
political, and ontological dimensions, directly expresses a moral
aspiration and anxiety: a sense of the possibility of a moral culture,
and of finding one's own identity and power in prophesying and
contributing to its inauguration, coupled with a sense of being
blocked by culture as it stands from any immediate route toward this
cultural transfiguration. Holderlin has this to say about his aspirations in a letter of 1793 to his half-brother Karl Gok:
My affections are now less directed toward particular individuals. The
object of my love is the entire human race, though not, of course, as we so
often find it, namely in a condition of corruption, servility, and inertia ... I
love the race of coming centuries. For this is my deepest hope, the faith that
keeps me strong and vital: our grandchildren will have it better than we,
freedom must finally come, and virtue will better flourish in the warmth of
freedom's sacred light than in the ice-cold zone of despotism ... This is the
sacred purpose of my wishes and my activity: that I might stir the seeds of
change that will ripen in a future age.35
And here is what he has to say two years later, in a letter to Schiller,
about his frustration in his hopes. "I am frozen and numb in the
winter that is all around me. The heavens are as iron, and I am as
stone."36 These remarks are expressions of Kantian-Schillerian
aspirations to realize one's rational dignity and freedom in a transfigured moral culture, to secure one's identity in contributing as a poet
to the transfiguration of culture, and of awareness of the deadness
and inertia of culture as it stands in embodying antagonisms. This
aspiration and this awareness are all at once ontological, political,
psychological, moral, and quasi-religious.
We can trace how these dimensions of aspiration and frustration
are woven together in "The Poet's Vocation," "Dichterberuf," as a
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Romantic elegy. What picture of our halting progress and of the
poet's role in it does it develop?
The poem opens with the sense that once, in prehistory, nature
and the divine interacted, preparing a place for a humanity not yet
on the scene. "Shores of Ganges heard the paean for the god / Of joy
when Bacchus came, conquering all, / Young, from the Indus" (1-3).
There is, in nature's reception of the god, as it were a second, higher
nature within nature. It is the task of the god to rouse humanity from
its merely instinctive, natural existence, into an awareness of something higher, an awareness that is dimly embedded in its nascent
self-consciousness. Bacchus came "with holy wine / Rousing the
people from their slumber" (3-4). This arousal or first awakening to
self-consciousness takes place, the reference to Bacchus suggests,
through ritual, not just because we have intentionality somehow
wired into our minds one by one.
This first arousal through ritual to self-consciousness is not,
however, complete. An "angel of our time" is needed to arouse us
further,37 to "Give the laws, / Give life to us" (6-7), to enable us now
fully to realize our higher nature in a moral culture of free, reciprocal
recognition and attention under moral law. The appearance that is
needed of the angel of our time is to take place neither through ritual
nor through the ordinary routines of farming, hunting, and housekeeping, in which we reason, and are aware of ourselves as
reasoning, but only instrumentally. "Not the thing that is man's care
and skill / Inside a house or underneath the sky" (9-10) shall now
further awaken us, albeit that these cultural routines are more than
animal activities: "a man fends and feeds more nobly / Than animals
do" (11-12). Nor will it help simply to love and care for others,
unless we first learn what it is to love and care for a human being,
and for human beings with opposed interests, rather than for a pet.
It is instead poets who are suited for the highest, "Der Hochste, der
ists, dem wir geeignet sind" (14). Dedicated to care and service of the
highest, poets are ever anew through their singing to enable friendly
hearts to take it in, "Dap naher, immerneu besungen / Ihn die befreundete Brust vernehme" (15-16), thus enabling the higher birth throughout
the people of a transfigured culture that is responsive to the highest.
So far, in stanzas 1 to 4, this is the optimistic side of the more or
less standard Kantian-Schillerian story of the development of a
fully human culture out of nature through a first birth of the human
in ritual and a second birth through the poet's work in expressing
the highest. There now occurs, however, a complicated extended
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apostrophe, occupying all of stanzas 5 to 7, as the poet addresses
successively "you heavenly gods / And all you streams and shores /
hilltops and woods" (17-18) and "You deeds rampaging out in the
wide world / You days of destiny, fast and furious" (25-26). The
substance of this apostrophe, the independent clause asking a
question of all the things addressed, does not begin until the first
line of the eighth stanza. The effect of this extended, multiple,
jumbled apostrophe, with all its images of violence -"by the hair
one of you / Seized us" (19-20); "dumbfounding / the mind"
("stumm / Der Sinn uns wards") (22-23); "as if struck by lightning"
(24); "rampaging out in the wide world" (25) - is to interrupt and
block the imagination of the smooth completion of the poet's task.
Something, it seems, is violently in the world, and perhaps in us,
that the poets, for all their dedication and appointed work, cannot
take up, engage with, and make use of as material to be transfigured
into the life of a moral culture. If the gods come in this way multiply, violently, rage-drunk, loosing deeds that cannot be held or
gathered ("ruhelosen Thaten") - then what now is to be done?
Should the poets then conceal, repress, or deny this violent waywardness of the ways of the gods in the world? "Should we not
speak of you?" "Euch sollten wir verschweigen?" (29). There seems
in the face of the ways of the world no way to go on with the task of
the poet. Art threatens to collapse into something idly aesthetic. The
harmonies that poets are capable of seem condemned to idleness
and impotence, seem destined only "to ring as if in idle caprice"
("Muthig und miipig" - brazenly and idly)/ Some child had dared to
touch for fun ("im Scherz") / The master's consecrated and pure
strings" (31-33).
This violent, incoherent culture in which art is reduced to the
aesthetic is further a culture dominated by thankless consumptiveness: "Too long all things divine have been put to use / Heavenly
powers trifled away, mercies / Squandered for sport, thankless, a /
Generation of schemers" (45-47). In the service of thankless, competitive consumptiveness, we name and number what is higher,
thinking to make use of it by quantifying it, but therein missing its
meaning. "The telescope scans and quantifies / And names with
names the heaven's stars" (51-52). We make "the good ... / Play for
a fee like a beast captive" (38, 40).
hi a culture under the sway of entertainment, consumption, and
instrumental reason, what place is there then for the poet? The
poet's identity and sense of himself falter. The narrative shifts fully
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out of the envisioning of the poet's work and into the interrogation of
present despair at an apparently impossible vocation. "Was it for
this" ("darum hast du") (34), this present condition of impotent
dejection, that the poet "heard the prophets of the East / And Greek
song and lately ... / Voices of thunder" (34-36)? "Was it for this?" the very question that launches Wordsworth's Prelude on its course
when in Book I, line 273, Wordsworth turns from an overwhelming
sense of failure and self-betrayal in his inability to find a high theme
that will lend his poetry a serious life in culture, therein establishing
his own poetic identity, to the activity of recollecting his halting
growth in nature and culture.
And here too, as partly in Wordsworth, there is a partial recovery
of a more modest sense of poetic power, rooted in gratitude and
remembrance and in the abandonment of the wish to transfigure the
entire culture in accordance with one's vision. After one has been
left "unsouled" ("entseelt") (44) by the failure of the highest ambition to transfigure the whole of culture now by bringing forth the
word, it is possible to close one's eyes, or have them covered with
night, giving up one's highest hieratic ambitions. "And yet with holy
night the father will veil / Our eyes, that still we may not perish"
(53-54). An expansive, puffed up power can never force heaven.
"Doch es zwinget / Nimmer die weite Gewalt den Himmel" (55-56).
"Nor is it good to be too knowing" (57). Yet the submission of our
wills and vision to the mysteries of nature, holy night, and the father,
now letting culture to some extent go as our wills are chastened by
our lack of clarity and vision, is not a lapse or reduction back into
mere animality either. There is a work of thankfulness still to be
undertaken, a preserving and containing (behalt) (58) of what is
higher in a more muted form. This work is not easily undertaken
alone. "Yet to keep and contain it alone is a hard burden" (58-59).
When alone, the poet's envisionings may become too grandiose and
lead to madness. So "others the poet / Gladly joins who help understanding" (59-60), thus ratifying and reinforcing one another's now
muted powers and identities as those who respond more dimly and
receptively, in gratitude not excessive pride, to what is higher. Yet
even such pleas or prayers for joint work and understanding are, as
pleas or prayers, reminders of present antagonisms. "Man stands ...
lonely / Before God" (61-62). Hblderlin's highly charged, difficult,
and ambiguous syntax further reminds us of his difference from us,
making the poem an object that is resistant to any moralizing
appropriation to some form of cultural work. His work is informed
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not by secure possession of divine power and knowledge of how to
spread it through culture, but by God's fault or absence or lack
("Gottes Fehl" [64]).
Not then as prophets and installers of an accomplished moral
culture, not in secure possession of an apocalyptic knowledge of last
things, but protected by simplicity ("es schiizet die Einfalt ihn")
(62), with neither weapons nor subterfuges (62), we may stand or
persist, possessed of human identities, powers, and possibilities that
are dimly responsive to what is higher, but veiled, and are not
themselves divine. Thus we may stand, so long as God's being, but
not being present, helps us in our human works, "so lange, bis
Gottes Fehl hilft" (64). There 38
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